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Abstract
Ever since the early days of European merger control, the European Commission (“Commission”) has relied heavily on information provided by the notifying parties and by relevant third
parties in carrying out its review of concentrations. More recently, the Commission has added
economic analyses and market surveys, as well as the review of internal documents, as major
elements. Over time, it is fair to say that the depth and breadth of the information gathering
and analysis has grown significantly, making European merger review a resource-intensive and
sometimes very drawn-out exercise. With that in mind, and after criticism from stakeholders, the
Commission has in recent months sought to streamline and simplify the process. In December
2013, it adopted a package of measures to that effect (“Merger Simplification Package”), and has
proposed some further measures in its White Paper “Towards more effective EU merger control,”
published in July 2014. This paper provides a high-level view of the way in which the Commission carries out a merger investigation nowadays. In particular, we focus on four areas that are key
to understanding the current anatomy of the fact-finding investigation. We also discuss the process through which, in certain cases, the Commission grants access to file through a “data room”
procedure.
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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the early days of European merger control,1 the
European Commission (“Commission”) has relied heavily on
µ This Essay was first published in FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE,
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 2014 (Barry Hawk ed., 2015). This Essay is
based on the legal context as of August 2014.
* Partner at Linklaters LLP, Brussels.
** Associate at Linklaters LLP, Brussels.
1. The first Merger Regulation was adopted in 1989. See Council Regulation
4064/89/EC on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. L 395/1. It
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information provided by the notifying parties and by relevant third
parties in carrying out its review of concentrations. More recently, the
Commission has added economic analyses2 and market surveys, as
well as the review of internal documents, as major elements. Over
time, it is fair to say that the depth and breadth of the information
gathering and analysis has grown significantly, making European
merger review a resource-intensive and sometimes very drawn-out
exercise.
With that in mind, and after criticism from stakeholders, the
Commission has in recent months sought to streamline and simplify
the process. In December 2013, it adopted a package of measures to
that effect (“Merger Simplification Package”),3 and has proposed
some further measures in its White Paper “Towards more effective EU
merger control,” published in July 2014.4
This paper provides a high-level view of the way in which the
Commission carries out a merger investigation nowadays. In
particular, we focus on four areas that are key to understanding the
current anatomy of the fact-finding investigation. We also discuss the
process through which, in certain cases, the Commission grants
access to file through a “data room” procedure.
I.

SUBMISSION OF NOTIFICATION: FORM CO OR SHORT
FORM CO

A. Pre-Notification Contacts and Notification of a Concentration
Concentrations that have a Union dimension are required to be
notified to the Commission using an official notification form,
was replaced by an amended Regulation in 2004 after the first major overhaul. See Council
Regulation 139/2004/EC on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. L
24/1 [hereinafter EUMR].
2. See, e.g., OECD Policy Roundtable, Economic Evidence in Merger Analysis 245-60
(DAF/COMP(2011)23, July 27, 2012) [hereinafter OECD Policy Roundtable].
3. See Commission Regulation 802/2004/EC Implementing Council Regulation
139/2004/EC on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. L 133/1,
amended by Commission Regulation 1033/2008/EC, 2008 O.J. L 279/3 and by Commission
Implementing Regulation 1269/2013/EC, 2013 O.J. L 336/1 [hereinafter Implementing
Regulation]; see also Commission Notice on a Simplified Procedure for Treatment of Certain
Concentrations under Council Regulation 139/2004/EC, 2013 O.J. C 366/04 [hereinafter
Notice on Simplified Procedure]. The Merger Simplification Package has been implemented
through updates to the Implementing Regulation and the Notice on Simplified Procedure.
4. See European Commission, White Paper: Towards More Effective EU Merger
Control, COM (2014) 449 Final (July 2014) [hereinafter White Paper].
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referred to as a “Form CO.”5 Certain categories of concentrations are
eligible for treatment under the so-called “simplified procedure,”
including those that do not give rise to so-called affected markets.6
For this purpose, the notifying party may use a “Short Form CO,”
which is less burdensome in terms of the information and data
required.7 The rationale for this procedure is that a less in-depth
review is required for transactions which are unlikely to raise any
competition concerns. Since the Commission introduced it in 2000,
the simplified procedure has been extensively used. At present, it is
estimated to account for sixty to seventy percent of all notifications.8
The submission of a Form CO requires the provision of
considerable information on the undertakings concerned by the
concentration, the concentration itself, the relevant product and
geographic markets, the conditions of competition in the affected
markets (including the structure of supply and demand, the degree of
product differentiation and closeness of competition, market entry and
exit, the nature and importance of research and development, the
existence of cooperative agreements, information on trade
associations), and contact details. In addition, the Form CO specifies
the supporting documentation that must be provided, of which Section
5.4 documents are of particular importance: Section 5.4 of the Form
CO requires the submission of internal documents such as board
presentations, surveys, analyses, reports and studies discussing the
proposed concentration, the economic rationale for the concentration
and competitive significance or the market context in which it takes
place.9
Although not mandatory, it is standard practice for the parties
and their advisors to engage in pre-notification contacts with the case
team at Directorate-General for Competition (“DG Competition”) so
as to determine, among other things, the exact scope of information to
5. The Form CO is set out as Annex I to the Implementing Regulation, supra note 3
[hereinafter Form CO].
6. Notice on Simplified Procedure, supra note 3, ¶¶ 5-6.
7. The Short Form CO is set out as Annex II to the Implementing Regulation, supra note
3 [hereinafter Short Form CO].
8. See Commission Press Release, Mergers: Commission Consults on Proposal for
Simplifying under the EU Merger Regulation, IP/13/288, (Mar. 27, 2013) (mentioning that the
proposed changes that were put in place later that year “could allow up to 70% of the all
notified mergers to qualify for review under the Commission’s simplified procedure, i.e., about
10% more than today”).
9. See DG Competition’s Best Practices on the Conduct of EC Merger Control
Proceedings, ¶ 17 (Jan. 2004) [hereinafter Merger Best Practices].
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be submitted, thereby minimizing the risk of a decision of
incompleteness.10 During pre-notification, the parties may seek to
confirm whether the simplified procedure is available and whether
information waivers can be obtained. Such waivers with regard to
mandatory information requirements will be granted where “the
Commission considers that compliance with those obligations or
requirements is not necessary for the examination of the case.”11 One
purpose of the amendments adopted in December 2013 is to facilitate
a wider use of waivers.12
B. Informational Burdens on the Notifying Parties
While the text of the notification forms had not undergone any
material changes until the recent adoption of the Merger
Simplification Package, in practice, the informational burdens have
grown considerably over the years, together with a significant
increase in the importance, scope and duration of the pre-notification
phase. The following points are worth mentioning in that regard.
First, where there are complex issues of jurisdiction or
substance, informal meetings and discussions between the merging
parties and the Commission’s case team can stretch over an extensive
period of time―from a few weeks to several months. Stakeholders
have complained that sometimes even for cases qualifying for
treatment under the simplified procedure, the pre-notification phase
has been quite lengthy. This has changed lately as part of the
December 2013 streamlining process. Indeed, the Notice on
Simplified Procedure now acknowledges that:
[P]re-notification contacts, in particular the submission of a draft
notification, may be less useful in cases . . . where there are no
reportable markets since the parties are not engaged in business
activities in the same product and geographic market, or in a
product market which is upstream or downstream from a product

10. See id. § 3 (regarding pre-notification contacts). The Merger Simplification Package
has also provided clarifications on pre-notification contacts in the Introductory Part (point 1.2)
of the revised Form CO [hereinafter Revised Form CO] and the Introductory Part (point 1.3) of
the revised Short Form CO [hereinafter Revised Short Form CO].
11. See Implementing Regulation, supra note 3, art. 4(2).
12. See Revised Form CO, supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.4(g); see also
Revised Short Form CO, supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.6(g).
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market in which any other party to the concentration is
engaged.13

Second, the amount and level of detail of the information
requests from the case team during pre-notification discussions have
considerably increased. By way of example, the Commission may ask
for internal documents going back several years, which can prove to
be a burdensome exercise for the notifying parties. The officials may
ask for sales and market share data over many years under a number
of market definition alternatives. It is also not unusual for the
Commission to ask for far more contact details than is requested in
the Form CO. In more complex cases, the Commission will encourage
the notifying party, and it will be in that party’s interest, to provide a
detailed competitive analysis for each of the “most affected” markets.
This may lead to several drafts of the notification form being
submitted as a result of requests for clarification and/or additional
questions from the case team―which itself may already be in contact
with interested third parties about possible concerns raised by the
proposed transaction.
Third, a further testimony of the increased informational burdens
borne by the notifying parties lies in the length of the final version of
Form CO documents nowadays. While our experience shows that in
the 1990s, the length of notification forms submitted to the
Commission was rarely over 200 pages (and in the early 1990s, less
than 100 pages), in recent years, Form COs have sometimes exceeded
500 pages and may be supplemented by many “work product”
annexes to be prepared by the notifying party.
C. The Merger Simplification Package
The Commission’s revisions under the Merger Simplification
Package, which entered into force on January 1, 2014, encompass a
series of revised documents, including a revised Notice on Simplified
Procedure and amendments to the Implementing Regulation. The aim
of the Merger Simplification Package is to simplify the Commission’s
merger review procedure in three ways: (i) by expanding the scope of
the simplified procedure, the net effect of which is expected to
increase the number of notifications eligible for simplified treatment
from around sixty percent in 2013 to around seventy percent in the
future; (ii) by reducing the information burden on the parties more
13. Notice on Simplified Procedure, supra note 3, ¶ 23.
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generally, including in cases notified using the standard Form CO;
and (iii) by streamlining the pre-notification process.14
The revisions made to the Forms annexed to the Implementing
Regulation consist primarily in streamlining the information
requirements for notifying mergers. These changes include an
increase in the market share thresholds for so-called “affected
markets” (from fifteen percent to twenty percent for horizontal
overlaps, and from twenty-five percent to thirty percent for vertical
relationships),15 the aim of which is to reduce the number of markets
that are defined as “affected” and thus require a detailed description
or a full Form CO. Reductions in certain sections of the revised Form
CO also include the removal of the requirement to provide
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) calculations. Other revisions
aim to simplify the procedural and/or informational requirements in
certain circumstances where the previously more burdensome
treatment was not warranted. In particular, a “super-simplified
notification” procedure is introduced in relation to joint ventures that
do not have activities in the European Economic Area (“EEA”).16
Under the White Paper adopted in July 2014, the Commission is even
providing to exempt such joint ventures from notification to the
Commission.17
Further, the Commission has included in the revised Form CO
additional references to categories of information for which, based on
the Commission’s experience, it may be appropriate to submit, in prenotification, a written request for a waiver. Such categories are as
follows: data on participations in other undertakings, details of past
acquisitions of undertakings, categories (ii) and (iii) of section 5.4
documents, requested information for certain affected markets or for
certain other markets in which the notified operation may have a
significant impact, value or volume-based data for market size and
shares, capacity data, details of cooperative agreements, and contact
details for trade associations.18
However, the Merger Simplification Package also includes
amendments that may increase the informational burdens on the
14. See Commission MEMO/13/1098, Mergers: Commission Adopts Package
Simplifying Procedures under the EU Merger Regulation, Frequently Asked Questions (Dec.
5, 2013) [hereinafter Commission MEMO/13/1098].
15. Revised Form CO, supra note 10, § 6.3.
16. Revised Short Form CO, supra note 10, § 8.
17. See White Paper, supra note 4, ¶ 77.
18. Revised Form CO, supra note 10, nn.15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 27, 28, 30, 31.
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parties, although admittedly these changes codify what has become
best practice in recent years. The following points are particularly
noteworthy in that regard.
First, the Commission has expanded the scope of the
requirement to provide supporting documents in the revised Form
CO. In particular, Section 5.4 now refers to additional categories of
documents to which access must be given: (i) minutes of the board
and shareholders’ meetings at which the transaction has been
discussed; (ii) board and shareholder documents where the transaction
is discussed in relation to potential alternative acquisitions;19 and (iii)
board and shareholder documents from the last two years that assess
any of the affected markets with respect to market shares, competitive
conditions, competitors (actual and potential), potential for sales
growth or expansion into other product or geographic markets, and/or
general market conditions. A requirement to submit internal
documents is now also introduced into the revised Short Form CO in
relation to cases that give rise to horizontal and/or vertical
relationships between the merging companies. Further, notifying
parties will now need to provide copies of documents prepared “by or
for” any members of the board or the shareholders’ meeting as well as
copies of documents “received by” those individuals. Accordingly,
the requirement to submit internal documents may now also catch
externally prepared market analyses, reports, studies, surveys,
presentations and any comparable documents that are received by
members of the board or the shareholders’ meeting.
Second, new wording appears in the revised notification forms
requiring notifying parties to present information not only on the
relevant product and geographic market definitions which the parties
put forward but also on “plausible alternative” product and
geographic market definitions. The Commission specifies that
“plausible alternative product and geographic market definitions can
be identified on the basis of previous Commission decisions and
judgments of the Union Courts and (in particular where there are no

19. See Commission MEMO/13/1098, supra note 14 (responding to criticism voiced in
relation to this requirement during the public consultation, the Commission has stated that it
“certainly does not want to look at a company’s entire internal M&A track record […].
Documents that are completely unrelated to the notified transaction do not have to be
provided. Documents that are relevant are those that analyse the transaction that is notified in
relation to alternative acquisitions.”).
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Commission or Court precedents) by reference to industry reports,
market studies and the notifying parties’ internal documents.”20
II. POST-FILING DOCUMENT PRODUCTION BY THE
NOTIFYING PARTIES
A. Requests for Information
According to Article 11 of the EU Merger Regulation
(“EUMR”), the Commission has the power to request information by
simple request or by decision from the notifying parties and other
undertakings. The distinction between a simple request for
information and a request by decision is particularly important when
assessing the consequences of not supplying information within the
required time limits. Failure to respond to a request by decision may
give rise to fines and/or periodic penalty payments.21
As explained under Part I.A above, it has become customary
over the years for the merging parties to engage in pre-notification
consultations with the Commission. The Merger Best Practices
explain that the early submission of information relating to all
potentially affected markets and possible competition concerns,
copies of internal documents that are to be provided with the
notification form, and any elements demonstrating efficiency claims
that the parties propose to make “. . . may avoid requests for
additional information from the notifying parties at a late stage in the
procedure and possible declarations of incompleteness. . . .”22
In many earlier cases, pre-notification discussions―together
with the provision of a substantially complete draft notification (or of
multiple drafts depending on the complexity of the case) for the case
team to review and comment on―ensured that, upon formal filing,
notification forms contained to a large extent all information deemed
necessary by the case team to assess the concentration. As a result, the
number and breadth of Article 11 information requests for the
notifying party received after the effective notification date were
relatively limited.
The extent of the information to be provided by the parties for
the purpose of notifying a merger to the Commission has considerably
20. Revised Form CO, supra note 10, § 6.
21. EUMR, supra note 1, arts. 14(1)(c), 15(1)(a).
22. Merger Best Practices, supra note 9, ¶ 16.
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developed over the years, as detailed under Part I.B above. As a
result, pre-notification discussions have become lengthier and
notification forms increasingly more detailed. Despite this, the
merging parties may sometimes face detailed information requests
after formal submission of a Form CO. Such requests may subject the
notifying parties to data-gathering exercises to be completed within
very short deadlines, generally a couple of days. Requests to provide
further internal documents have become particularly burdensome as
they are typically increasingly broadly defined (generally calling for
production across several years) and most often not tied to any
particular custodian. In most cases, it remains for the notifying parties
to delineate themselves the scope of the documents to which access
must be given and to identify likely custodians from which to
download e-mail folders and collect hard copy documents through
site visits. As an illustration of this, we cite below two sample
requests for the production of internal documents on which we have
assisted notifying parties.
The first example is: “Please provide all internal documents,
including briefings, e-mails, memos of meetings, presentations, for
the past two years . . . , and external documents discussing: . . .” This
document collection request was made during Phase II proceedings
and was one of many questions included in an Article 11 request for
information. Eight topics were listed in relation to which the
documents were to be provided over a two-year time frame.
The second example is: “Please submit for the below mentioned
products for the EEA and for the [affected] markets (as indicated in
the 6(1)c decision): All analyses, memorandums, reports, reviews,
presentations of any format, performed either internally or by third
parties (such as external consultants or financial institutions), and
used in preparation, in the realization, and follow-up of the decision
making process or reporting related to these products.” This document
collection request was also made during Phase II proceedings. No
time frame was specified as regards the creation of the requested
documents. There were many affected markets listed in the Article
6(1)(c) decision. The deadline to respond was seven days.
B. “Stop-the-Clock” and Declarations of Incompleteness
There are various means by which the strict statutory deadlines
for the Commission to review a notified transaction under the EUMR
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may be suspended or reset, including declarations of incompleteness
and “stop-the-clock” mechanisms.
In the event that the Commission discovers after formal
notification that the information contained in the (Short) Form CO is
incomplete in any material respect, it will give the parties an
opportunity to urgently rectify such omissions before a declaration of
incompleteness is adopted. The time permitted for such rectification is
typically no longer than one or two days. However, if the
Commission finds that the omissions immediately hinder the proper
investigation of the proposed transaction, it will adopt a declaration of
incompleteness (or the parties may withdraw the notification). In such
a case, the notification will only become effective, and the Phase I
deadlines will only start to run, on the date on which the complete
information is received by the Commission.23
Further, at any point during Phase I or Phase II, the clock may be
stopped where, owing to circumstances for which one of the
undertakings involved in the concentration is responsible, the
Commission has had to request information by decision pursuant to
Article 11 or order an inspection by decision pursuant to Article 13.24
Given that most merger filings are preceded by a lengthy and
detailed pre-notification phase, the aim of which is to ensure that the
notification form is complete, the use of the stop-the-clock provision
and declarations of incompleteness is relatively exceptional, as
explicitly mentioned in Article 10(4) itself. However, they may occur
in some cases. For example, the recent Zimmer-Biomet merger,25
notified to the Commission on 3 June 2014, was declared incomplete
on 11 June 2014, supposedly because the parties filed with no or little
pre-notification discussions.
It is also interesting to note that while decisions to stop the clock
in order to seek additional information from the parties traditionally
occur in the early stages of a Phase II probe (i.e. when the
Commission is engaged in intensive information gathering), in more
recent reviews the Commission has stopped the clock at a later stage
of its investigations, after entering into remedy discussions with the
merging parties. This is generally aimed at giving the Commission
additional time to assess in greater depth the remedy package. A stop23. Implementing Regulation, supra note 3, art. 5(2); Merger Best Practices, supra note
9, ¶ 23; EUMR, supra note 1, art. 10(1).
24. EUMR, supra note 1, art. 10(4).
25. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.7265 (Zimmer/Biomet), (ongoing).
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the-clock decision at such a late stage of the procedure was adopted in
the context of the Commission’s reviews of Telefónica’s purchase of
E-Plus (approved subject to conditions)26 and Hutchison’s acquisition
of O2 Ireland (cleared by the Commission subject to conditions).27
More recently, in the context of its ongoing review of Liberty
Global’s planned acquisition of Ziggo, the Commission also decided
to stop the clock after having received and market-tested the remedies
offered by Liberty Global.28
C. Impact of the Merger Simplification Package
As described under Part I.C above, a number of changes
included in the Merger Simplification Package may prove more
burdensome for parties looking to file a merger notification with the
Commission. This is particularly the case as regards the amendments
to section 5.4 of the revised Form CO (and the insertion of a similar
requirement to provide internal business documents in the revised
Short Form CO), and the requirement for the notifying parties to
present (and thus describe in detail) “all plausible alternative product
and geographic market definitions.”
While such amendments undoubtedly have the potential to
increase the amount of information exchanged with the case team
during pre-notification and provided in the notification form, they
may reduce the number and volume of requests for additional
information addressed to the parties―whether informally or pursuant
to Article 11 of the EUMR―after the effective notification date.
However, other revisions are a clear indication that the
Commission reserves the right to request further information from the
notifying parties at any time. This is the case even in relation to
sections of the Form CO and Short Form CO that the Merger
Simplification Package aims to streamline. For example, although the
requirement to provide contact details for the five largest independent
suppliers to the parties to the concentration has been removed from
the revised Form CO, the Commission has highlighted in a new
footnote that it may at any time request additional contact details for
any category of market participants, whether identified or not in the
26. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.7018 (Telefónica Deutschland/E-Plus),
(July 2, 2014).
27. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6992 (Hutchison 3G UK/Telefónica
Ireland), (May 28, 2014).
28. See Commission Decision No. COMP/ M.7000 (Liberty Global/Ziggo), (ongoing).
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revised Form CO. The revised notification forms also expressly state
that information that the Commission has waived during the prenotification phase may nonetheless be subsequently required from the
notifying parties.29
III. MARKET TESTING BY THE COMMISSION
The Commission actively engages in so-called “market testing”
in order to verify and supplement the information collected from the
notifying parties. The Commission is given wide powers to seek
qualitative and quantitative data from, and the views of, a wide range
of market players, in particular customers, competitors and suppliers.
Further, where remedies are offered, the Commission will market-test
them with third parties, generally those who have been most active in
providing information during the investigation or have expressed a
desire to be consulted.
The Commission’s investigative powers were enhanced during
the 2004 merger reform to broadly align them with those available
under Council Regulation 1/2003 for Articles 101 and 102 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).30 In
order to carry out the duties assigned to it by the EUMR, the
Commission is vested with the powers to request information,31 to
conduct all necessary inspections of undertakings and associations of
undertakings,32 and to impose fines and periodic penalty payments for
breach of the obligations under the EUMR.33
The most common tool to gather evidence is through written
requests for information, which are typically sent nowadays by way
of e-questionnaires and may be followed by supplementary calls
and/or formal and informal third-party (telephone) interviews with a
view to clarifying responses and gathering further information. Over
the years, there has been a creeping increase in the length and detail
of questionnaires sent to market participants, mainly customers of the
notifying parties and to a lesser extent their (actual or potential)
29. Revised Form CO, supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.4(g); Revised Short
Form CO, supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.6(g).
30. Council Regulation No. 1/2003/EC on the Implementation of the Rules on
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. L1/1 (now Articles 101
and 102 TFEU).
31. See EUMR, supra note 1, art. 11; see also supra Part II.A (the Commission may
require information by simple request or by decision).
32. EUMR, supra note 1, art. 13.
33. Id. arts. 14, 15.
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competitors and suppliers. Further, many such requests go
unanswered or are answered in a very summary fashion. In particular,
responses are often limited to a mere “yes” or “no” without any
reasons provided to substantiate them, and they are thus of little value
to the Commission’s investigation. For instance, one might question
the robustness of findings that are based on statements such as: “the
majority of the respondents to the market test consider that . . .” or “9
out of 17 respondents state that. . . .” As regards the written
questionnaires, the Commission has held on several occasions that:
[I]t is important to note that the market investigation is by no
means an opinion poll. For instance, the fact that the majority of
third parties provide a similar opinion in reply to a specific
question, can only be an indication for the Commission’s own
investigation, not a foregone conclusion. Likewise, it would not
be appropriate to assume that the answers to the questionnaires
can always be considered to be fully informed and objective. The
specific level of knowledge of respondents might vary, the
questions might have been misunderstood, the replies might be
more or less representative, and the opinion provided might be
biased to influence the Commission’s decision-making process in
a certain way.34

The following cases are particularly revealing in that regard.
First, as part of the Commission’s market investigation into the
proposed acquisition of MAN by Volkswagen,35 many questionnaires
were sent to a wide range of market participants. More than 1,000
questionnaires were sent to truck customers, of whom only around
fifteen percent responded. Only a small number of customers (12% of
the respondents) indicated that prices could rise after the merger. Half
of these customers were based in national markets where the
combined market share of the notifying parties in the overall heavy
truck market would be below thirty-five percent. The remaining
customers did not substantiate their claims.
Second, in the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and
NYSE Euronext,36 which was ultimately blocked by the Commission,
34. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6663, (Ryanair/Aer Lingus III), ¶ 28 (Feb.
27, 2013); see also Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4439 (Ryanair/Aer Lingus), ¶ 39
(June 27, 2007); Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6314 (Telefónica UK/Vodafone
UK/Everything Everywhere/JV), ¶ 23 (Sept. 4, 2012).
35. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6267 (Volkswagen/Man), (Sept. 26, 2011).
36. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6166 (Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext), (Feb.
1, 2012).
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the case team conducted a wide-reaching market investigation. In this
context, in the first phase, the Commission sent over 600 detailed
Article 11 requests for information covering seven different groups of
market participants, of which only approximately 250 responses were
received. In the second phase, over 150 questionnaires were sent to
targeted market participants, of which only around 100 responses
were received. Further, more than twenty teleconferences and
meetings were conducted with a range of customers and competitors.
Third, in Universal’s proposed acquisition of EMI’s recorded
music business,37 which was cleared subject to conditions, the
Commission launched a market test of the commitments submitted by
the notifying party, by sending 238 questionnaires to both customers
and competitors of the notifying party. In the words of the
Commission itself, “a number of customers provided very
rudimentary (and therefore not very meaningful) replies to the market
test questionnaire, essentially limited to answering yes or no to
specific questions without providing any explanation of the reasons
supporting their reply.”38
Fourth, in the context of Outokumpu’s proposed acquisition of
Inoxum,39 which was approved subject to conditions, the Commission
carried out an extensive market investigation both in Phase I and II.
Overall, it sent out 2,251 questionnaires to customers (including
distributors) of the notifying parties and fifty questionnaires to their
competitors, and conducted a significant number of interviews with a
number of third parties. The Commission also market-tested the
commitments submitted by the parties by means of eight sets of
questionnaires as well as a number of telephone calls.
In terms of inspections carried out by the Commission, the
acquisition of MWM by Caterpillar in October 2011 is particularly
interesting. Inspections pursuant to Article 13(4) of the EUMR were
carried out at the premises of CAT in the United Kingdom and of
MWM in Germany, and were continued at the Commission’s
premises in Brussels.40 Those inspections, which lasted six days, were
undertaken because the Commission had indications that the parties
might have: (i) provided misleading information in response to
37. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music Group/EMI Music),
(Sept. 21, 2012).
38. Id. at n. 497.
39. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6471 (Outokumpu/Inoxum), (Nov. 7, 2012).
40. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6106 (Caterpillar/MWM), ¶ 14 (Oct. 19, 2011).
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Article 11 information requests; (ii) provided misleading information
in the notification of the proposed concentration; and (iii)
implemented the notified concentration before it had been cleared by
the Commission in contravention of Article 7(1) of the EUMR.
Site visits to the manufacturing or other facilities of the parties to
the concentration, their competitors, customers and/or suppliers may
also sometimes be undertaken by the Commission. For example, as
part of its extensive market investigation into the proposed
concentration between Outokumpu and Inoxum, the Commission
organized a site visit to Outokumpu’s premises in Finland and to one
of the parties’ major customers in the Netherlands in order to gain a
better understanding of the industry in which the transaction was to
take place.41
Customer surveys are also occasionally used in merger control
cases to help define the relevant (product and geographic) market(s)
and assess competition within them.42 For example, in Ryanair’s first
attempt to acquire Aer Lingus, which was prohibited in June 2007,
the Commission conducted a customer survey at Dublin Airport
primarily for the purpose of obtaining a representative sample of
responses from customers who departed from Dublin to test Ryanair’s
claim that, from the perspective of the customer, Aer Lingus and
Ryanair do not compete with each other. The Commission explained
that such a survey was necessary to gather the views of affected
individual customers (i.e. approximately 14 million passengers
traveling with the merging parties) which, unlike so-called “business
customers,” could not be contacted by the Commission by way of the
classic investigative techniques (questionnaires, telephone interviews)
in a meaningful way.43
Further, where the Commission believes it is desirable, in the
interests of the fact-finding investigation, to hear in a single forum the
opposing views that have been put forward by the notifying parties
and third parties as to key market data and characteristics and the
effects of the concentration on competition in the markets concerned,
41. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6471 (Outokumpu/Inoxum), ¶ 114 (Nov. 7,
2012).
42. See Ian Thompson & James Harvey, When to Pop the Question(s)? The Use of
Surveys in Merger Control, 35 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 92 (2014). These authors argue
that “a survey will give the best results if it mimics the environmental and product
characteristics of the market.” Id.
43. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4439 (Ryanair/Aer Lingus), ¶¶ 35-36, Annex I
(June 27, 2007).
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it may decide to invite them to “triangular” meetings. Such triangular
meetings are on a voluntary basis and in addition to bilateral meetings
between the Commission and the notifying parties, other involved
parties or third parties.44 However, to date, the use of triangular
meetings as an investigatory instrument has been somewhat limited.
IV. AN INCREASING USE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSES
In addition to gathering an increasing amount of internal
documents and similar evidence from the notifying parties and (more
rarely) third parties, economic analyses, including modeling when
appropriate, have become more widely used in European merger
control, especially but not exclusively in the more complex cases.45 In
this regard, it is worth noting that the Merger Simplification Package
has included in the revised Form CO a non-binding request for
economic data in cases in which quantitative economic analysis for
the affected markets is likely to be useful.46 While such information is
not required for the Form CO to be considered complete, the notifying
parties are nevertheless encouraged to provide the data as early as
possible, particularly in light of the strict statutory deadlines for
Union merger control.
A number of elements have contributed to an increasing use by
the Commission of economics to define markets and analyze their
functioning, assess closeness of competition, predict the likely (price)
effects of mergers, validate efficiency claims or predict the impact of
remedies, as well as to generate evidence through a range of empirical
techniques. The following elements are particularly noteworthy in
that regard:
First, in 2003, the economic capabilities of DG Competition
were enhanced, in particular through the appointment of the Chief
Competition Economist (“CCE”). The CCE, currently Professor
Massimo Motta, is part of DG Competition and assists in evaluating
the economic impact of its actions. The Chief Economist Team
(“CET”), headed by the CCE, is composed of over twenty specialized
economists, many of whom hold a Ph.D. in industrial organization.
The main tasks of the CCE and his office are: (i) to provide
independent guidance on methodological issues of economics and
44. See Merger Best Practices, supra note 9, ¶¶ 38, 39.
45. See OECD Policy Roundtable, supra note 2, at 245-60.
46. Revised Form CO, supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.8.
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econometrics in the application of EU competition rules; (ii) to
provide general guidance in individual competition cases from their
early stages; (iii) to provide detailed guidance in the most important
competition cases involving complex economic issues and requiring
sophisticated quantitative analysis; and (iv) to contribute to the
development of general policy instruments with an economic content,
as well as assist with cases pending before the Community Courts.47
Second, as part of the 2004 merger reform, the previous
substantive merger test based on the creation or strengthening of
dominance was replaced by a significant impediment to effective
competition (“SIEC”) test. Further, guidelines on the assessment of
horizontal mergers48 and non-horizontal mergers49 were adopted in
2004 and 2008, respectively.
Third, in October 2011, the Commission published best practices
for the submission of economic evidence and data collection in cases
concerning the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in
merger cases (“Economic Best Practices”).50 The Economic Best
Practices, which are guided by a desire to ensure transparency and
accountability, provide practical guidance on: (i) the content and
presentation of economic or econometric analysis in order “to
facilitate its assessment and the replication of any empirical results by
the Commission and/or other parties,” and (ii) how to respond to
Commission requests for quantitative data “to ensure that timely and
relevant input for the investigation can be provided.”51 On the latter
point, the Economic Best Practices place great emphasis on the
usefulness of early consultation with the Commission on the
availability of quantitative data. Such early consultation will allow
one to determine not only what data is available and its suitability, but
also in what form it can be provided, thereby facilitating the provision
of the data should the Commission make a data request.52 Further, the
47. See Lars-Hendrik Röller & Pierre A. Buigues, The Office of the Chief Competition
Economist at the European Commission (May 2005) (providing a more detailed description of
the role of the CCE and his office).
48. Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation
on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. C 31/5.
49. Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-Horizontal Mergers under the Council
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2008 O.J. C 265/6.
50. Best Practices for the Submission of Economic Evidence and Data Collection in
Cases Concerning the Application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and in Merger Cases (DG
Competition Staff Working Document, Oct. 2011) [hereinafter Economic Best Practices].
51. Id. ¶ 5.
52. Id. ¶¶ 73-76.
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Economic Best Practices stress the importance of cooperation in good
faith between the parties and the Commission in order to help both
sides deal more efficiently with data issues.53
The types of data used by the Commission for its quantitative
economic analysis in merger cases vary depending on the specificities
of the market(s) and data availability. This data is most commonly
collected from industry sources or from companies themselves. The
following are examples of types of economic data that the
Commission has deemed useful in recent merger cases:54
First, where a concentration between producers of retail products
that are sold to end-consumers takes place, “retail scanner data” is
often available, in particular via market research companies such as
Nielsen. Such transaction data about consumers’ purchases in a
representative sample of stores and over a significant period of time
can prove useful on a number of fronts. For example, the product
classifications contained in these datasets may provide first proxies of
the relevant market segmentations in the industry. Such market data
may also furnish useful information on the price positioning of the
parties’ brands and the competitive constraints exerted by the parties
on each other. Further, as it is typically readily available, retail
scanner data can be used to rapidly check the arguments put forward
by the parties and other market participants. A recent case in which
scanner data has been relied on by the Commission is the
Unilever/Sara Lee merger, which was cleared subject to conditions.
This case is particularly noteworthy in that the Commission
conducted a merger simulation by its own economists in order to
predict the likely impact of the proposed transaction on the deodorant
markets.55
Second, “bidding data” may prove particularly useful in
assessing a concentration between providers of services that business
customers purchase through structured procurement processes where
candidate suppliers bid against each other. Where such data is
available and is representative (in the sense that it covers a large
enough sample of tenders/bids), its analysis will likely provide
53. Id. ¶¶ 71-72.
54. See OECD Policy Roundtable, supra note 2, at 248-59; see also Revised Form CO,
supra note 10, Introductory Part, point 1.8.
55. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5658 (Unilever/Sara Lee), (Nov. 17, 2010). For
the merger simulation conducted in that case, see in particular the Technical Annex to the
decision. See also Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5644 (Kraft Foods/Cadbury), (Jan. 6,
2010).
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valuable information on the closeness of competition between the
parties. Recent cases in which bidding data was gathered and
analyzed by the Commission to assess the competitive constraint
exerted by the parties on each other include the Baxter
International/Gambro merger,56 which was approved subject to
conditions, as well as the Siemens/Invensys Rail concentration,57
which the Commission also approved.
Third, data on customer switching may be particularly relevant
for the purpose of assessing closeness of competition. Upward pricing
pressure (“UPP”) measures make it possible to estimate the extent to
which the merged firm would have the incentive to raise prices postmerger given, in particular, prices, margins and diversion ratios
observed in the market. However, the extent to which such measures
will yield valuable results is inherently a function of the reliability of
the inputted data, particularly the diversion ratio measure used in the
UPP analysis. Further, such measures must not be reviewed in
isolation but rather in the context of other pieces of empirical
evidence.58 A UPP-type exercise was conducted, for example, by the
Commission in the Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria merger,59
which was cleared subject to conditions.
As emphasized in the Economic Best Practices,60 it is critical to
ensure that quantitative analysis is used only in those cases for which
sufficient accurate data exists and can be gathered and analyzed in a
timely fashion so as to generate meaningful results, while at the same
time reducing the burden on the involved parties and the Commission
posed by the production and processing of such data. In this regard, it
is worth noting that even though the Commission increasingly relies
on econometric evidence in merger control, it has on a number of
occasions considered that conducting a quantitative economic
analysis was not appropriate in a given case. For example, in its
investigation into the proposed merger between Deutsche Börse and
NYSE Euronext, which was ultimately prohibited, the Commission
56. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6851 (Baxter International/Gambro), (July 22,
2013).
57. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6843 (Siemens/Invensys Rail), (Apr. 18, 2013).
58. See OECD Policy Roundtable, supra note 2, at 255-56 (regarding UPP-type
exercises).
59. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6497 (Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange Austria),
(Dec. 12, 2012). The exact test used by the Commission in this case is the “gross upward
pricing pressure index” (“GUPPI”) test, which is a spin-off of the UPP test.
60. See Economic Best Practices, supra note 50, ¶¶ 51-52.
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concluded that “conducting any empirical analysis, in particular for
market definition purposes, would not have been meaningful given
the lack of suitable data required for those purposes.”61 Also, in the
assessment of the proposed creation of a joint venture between
Vodafone, Telefónica and Everything Everywhere in the field of
mobile commerce in the UK, the Commission considered that
“[g]iven the nascent state of the markets under consideration, there is
limited data available and therefore no extensive empirical analysis
could be undertaken.”62 Further, while in Ryanair/Aer Lingus the
available quantitative data was deemed sufficiently complete,
accurate and adequate to enable the Commission to conduct a
thorough empirical analysis (including two sets of regression analysis
to identify the level of competitive constraints exercised between the
parties and by their competitors as well as a price correlation
analysis),63 this was not the case in Olympic/Aegean Airlines.64 In the
context of the investigation related to the latter transaction, the
Commission clearly laid out the pre-conditions that need to be met for
a sophisticated empirical analysis to be informative:
(i) All the necessary data must be available to implement the
chosen empirical methodology and the available data must be of
adequate quality, otherwise the significance of the results
obtained is at most very limited; (ii) Empirical analysis in merger
cases necessarily involves the use of historical data. Thus, the
data to be usable in such analyses need to be a good indicator of
the likely impact of the merger on future competition; and (iii)
The sufficient variability in the data to identify references for
comparison.65

61. Commission Decision No. COMP/.6166 (Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext), ¶ 251
(Feb. 1, 2012).
62. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6314 (Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/ Everything
Everywhere/JV), ¶ 20 (Sept. 4, 2012). However, the Commission did consider and assess a
numerical analysis of foreclosure incentives submitted by the notifying parties.
63. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.4439 (Ryanair/Aer Lingus), ¶ 34, Annexes III,
IV (June 27, 2007).
64. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5830 (Olympic/Aegean Airlines), (Jan. 26,
2011). Note that Aegean’s first attempt to merge with Olympic in 2011 was blocked by the
Commission. However, the Commission subsequently approved the merger in 2013. See
Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6796 (Aegean/Olympic II), (Oct. 9, 2013) (not yet
published).
65. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5830 (Olympic/Aegean Airlines), ¶ 30 (Jan. 26,
2011).
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Finally, it is also interesting to note that in a number of recent
merger cases, the Commission’s market investigation has included a
so-called “market reconstruction” exercise. In particular, in several
cases, the Commission has sought to reconstruct the market shares of
the main players for some affected product categories or countries in
order to aid in its assessment of the notified transaction’s
compatibility with the common market. For example, in its Phase II
investigation of the Johnson & Johnson/Synthes merger, the
Commission reconstructed market shares in more than 50 product
markets in 30 countries in order to verify the accuracy of the parties’
estimates as the market data provided by the parties was deemed not
reliable in some instances.66 This resulted in the creation of a model,
producing market share data for the parties and a considerable number
of competitors, per product and geographic market.67 Market
reconstructions were also conducted, for example, in the acquisition
of Pride Foods (Gerber Emig) by Refresco (cleared subject to
conditions),68 in the US Airways/American Airlines merger (approved
subject to conditions),69 in the Cisco/Tandberg merger (cleared
subject to conditions),70 and in the acquisition of Varian by Agilent
(approved subject to conditions).71
V. “DATA ROOM” PROCEDURE
As a result of the growing use by the Commission of economic
analysis, econometric tools and market reconstruction in European
merger control, notifying parties have increasingly requested that the
data, as well as the aggregating tools (e.g. Microsoft Excel
spreadsheets) and models on which the Commission has based its
assessment be disclosed to them in order to verify the veracity and
accuracy of the Commission’s analysis and the nature of the
underlying data. In particular, notifying parties typically want to test
the Commission’s approach in at least four respects. First, the choice
66. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6266 (Johnson & Johnson/Synthes), § 6.1.2
(April 18, 2012).
67. See Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case COMP/M.6266 (Johnson &
Johnson/Synthes), ¶ 4 (Apr. 3, 2012).
68. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6924 (Refresco Group/Pride Foods), (Oct. 4,
2013).
69. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6607 (US Airways/American Airlines), (Aug. 5,
2013).
70. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5669 (Cisco/Tandberg), (Mar. 29, 2010).
71. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.5611 (Agilent/Varian), (Jan. 20, 2010).
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and quality of raw data selected for analysis. Second, the methods for
aggregating that data to incorporate it into models and analyses.
Third, the models used to “crunch” the data and the analysis of it.
Fourth, whether data has been accurately transferred from models to
Statements of Objections (“SOs”) and other documents produced by
the Commission.
The Economic Best Practices provide that “[w]hen granting
access to the file, the Commission may provide upon request the data
and codes underlying its final economic analysis or, to the extent that
they have been made available to the Commission, that of third
parties on which it intends to rely or take into account.”72 One of the
barriers to such access is the often confidential nature of the data,
which will typically have been provided by competitors of the
notifying parties and/or by other market participants. In order to
manage this conflict between respect for confidentiality and the rights
of defense of the notifying parties, the Economic Best Practices
provide that “[w]here necessary to protect the confidentiality of other
parties’ data, access to the data and codes will be granted only at DG
Competition premises in a so-called data room procedure, subject to
strict confidentiality obligations and secure procedures.”73
The Commission’s Hearing Officers act as an independent
arbiter where a dispute about the effective exercise of procedural
rights between parties and DG Competition arises in antitrust and
merger proceedings. They are frequently involved in decisions as to
whether the data room procedure is in a given case the most
appropriate tool to reconcile confidentiality requirements with
considerations relating to the right to be heard.74
Under the data room procedure,75 which needs to be adjusted to
the specifics of each case, part of the file, including confidential
information, is gathered in a physical data room at the Commission’s
72. Economic Best Practices, supra note 50, ¶ 47.
73. Id.
74. See Decision of the President of the European Commission No. 2011/695/EU on the
Function and Terms of Reference of the Hearing Officer in Certain Competition Proceedings,
2011 O.J. L 275/29, Chapter 4.
75. The Commission indicates that the data room procedure is along the same lines as
that used in antitrust cases. See Commission Notice on Best Practices for the Conduct of
Proceedings Concerning Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, 2011 O.J. C308/6, ¶¶ 97-98; see also
European Commission, DG Competition Antitrust Manual of Procedures, Internal DG
Competition Working Documents on Procedures for the Application of Articles 101 and 102
TFEU, Chapter 12, ¶¶ 111-119 (Mar. 2012).
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premises. Access to the data room is granted to a restricted group of
persons, usually economic advisors of the notifying parties and in
some cases external legal counsel.76 The economic advisors and
external legal counsel of the notifying parties that access the data
room are required to sign a confidentiality agreement. They may
produce a final report on the information contained in the data room
but may not disclose any confidential information to their client.
The importance of access to data used by the Commission for
economic analysis and market reconstruction has been highlighted by
numerous cases in which scrutiny of such data has been found to be
wanting. These cases underline the importance of notifying parties’
ability to check the Commission’s use of economic analysis, from the
raw data used all the way through to the transfer of data to the SO.
It is not unusual that a discussion may arise over the extent of
access to be granted. For example, in Universal/EMI,77 Universal
requested that the Hearing Officer amend the procedural rules
governing the use of the data room.78 In particular, it argued that its
rights of defense would be violated because: (i) the scope of the
disclosure was too narrow as it would not allow access to the raw data
and relevant codes that were used to build the final datasets on which
the CET’s economic analysis was run; (ii) specific provisions in the
rules restricting the use of the data would prevent Universal’s
economic advisors from properly verifying the CET’s analysis; and
(iii) the anonymization of the CET data would prevent the economic
advisors from understanding the specific factual context in which the
data was generated. In response, the Hearing Officer amended the
data room rules to ensure “that all raw data and codes would be
included in the data room” and to allow Universal’s economic
advisors “to conduct the tests and verifications of the CET’s analysis

76. Practice seems to vary between cases. For example, in Johnson & Johnson/Synthes,
the Hearing Officer granted access to the data room to both the legal and economic advisors of
the notifying parties, while in Universal Music Group/EMI Music, access was limited to
external economists. See Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music
Group/EMI Music), (Sept. 21, 2012) and Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case
COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music Group/EMI Music), (Sept. 11, 2012).
77. Commission Decision No. COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music Group/EMI Music),
(Sept. 21, 2012).
78. See Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music
Group/EMI Music), (Sept. 11, 2012); see also Dafydd Nelson, Comment: Universal Merger
Shows EU Data-Access Rules Can Be Eased, MLEX (2013).
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indicated in the letter.”79 It also accepted limited disclosure of the
confidential version of one of the economic advisors’ data room
reports containing information used to calculate royalty figures of the
parties. But the Hearing Officer considered that it was not
indispensable to lift the anonymization of the data that contained
sensitive business secrets. Further, it refused to grant full access to
adverse quantitative analysis and to admit Universal’s legal advisors
to the data room. This case is also interesting in that it shows that
notifying parties are unlikely to be granted access to third-party data
collected and used by the Commission prior to the issuance of the SO.
CONCLUSION
The scope of the information and data gathering in a merger
investigation varies depending on the complexity of the case and the
resources available. However, ever since the early days of the Merger
Regulation, there has been a creeping increase in the range of
information required to be provided by the merging parties in prenotification and in notification form, as well as in the volume and
detail of data sought from the notifying parties, other involved parties
and third parties (primarily customers, suppliers and competitors)
through information requests, inspections, bilateral and triangular
meetings, (telephone) interviews, customer surveys and other
investigatory tools. In particular, the Commission has become much
more demanding in relation to internal documents, often required to
be produced by the notifying parties across several years. There has
also been a significant rise in the use of economic analysis and
econometric tools in European merger control.

79. Final Report of the Hearing Officer in Case COMP/M.6458 (Universal Music
Group/EMI Music), ¶ 11 (Sept. 11, 2012).

